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ISOLATING LITIGANTS: A RESPONSE TO 
PAMELA BOOKMAN 
Alan M. Trammell* 
INTRODUCTION 
Several months ago, the world became obsessed with a dress. Depending 
on the angle from which you looked at it and, more importantly, how your eyes 
perceived certain colors, the dress appeared white and gold . . . or blue and 
black. Tens of millions of people viewed and debated it, and nearly everyone 
who saw it as white and gold (or blue and black) could not begin to imagine 
how someone else could perceive it in such a radically different way.1 
 In a recent article, Litigation Isolationism,2 Pamela Bookman identifies a 
phenomenon that similarly changes hue depending on one’s perspective or dis-
position. Bookman argues that four doctrines (personal jurisdiction, forum non 
conveniens, abstention comity, and the presumption against extraterritoriality)3 
conspire to make U.S. courts significantly less hospitable to transnational litiga-
tion.4 In Bookman’s assessment, such isolationism is counterproductive be-
cause the doctrines often fail to vindicate their stated goals of respecting the 
separation of powers, international comity, and defendants’ interests.5 The arti-
cle is crisp and elegant. It synthesizes disparate areas of law to elucidate a 
broader development in civil litigation. And it makes an important contribution 
 
 * Associate in Law, Columbia Law School. For helpful comments on earlier drafts 
of this Essay, I thank Derek Bambauer, Jane Bambauer, James Nelson, and Ryan Williams. I 
owe a special debt of gratitude to Pam Bookman for many enlightening conversations about 
the ideas that motivated her article and this Essay. Finally, I thank the editors of the Stanford 
Law Review for their excellent editing. 
 1. See Jonathan Mahler, The White and Gold (No, Blue and Black!) Dress That Melt-
ed the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1C4dsYX. 
 2. Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (2015). 
 3. Technically, the fourth “doctrine”—the presumption against extraterritoriality—is 
a canon of construction. As such, it is not so much the law as a way of interpreting the law. 
Accordingly, it is the most amenable to congressional tweaking. But such slight nuances are 
not critical for present purposes. 
 4. See Bookman, supra note 2, at 1089-99. Although “transnational litigation” can be 
a malleable term, Bookman offers a very useful working definition: “[C]ases involving for-
eign parties, foreign conduct, foreign law, or foreign effects.” Id. at 1083-84. 
 5. Id. at 1087; see also id. at 1119-33 (describing how each stated goal is undermined 
by avoidance doctrines). 
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to a growing literature on how the United States, once a magnet for transna-
tional litigation, has increasingly closed its doors to such cases.6 
If Bookman is arguing that this dress is white and gold, I don’t think of 
myself as the obdurate naysayer who insists that it is blue and black. Rather, I 
simply want to suggest that the blue-and-black crowd isn’t crazy—that there is 
a different way to understand the phenomenon, including its genesis and conse-
quences. In many respects, this other perspective is consistent with the account 
that Bookman offers. 
My first and principal contention is that litigation isolationism is not neces-
sarily a coherent or volitional project. Instead, it arose through the confluence 
of two different strands of jurisprudence—doctrinal coherence and domestic 
litigation avoidance. Second, I suggest that the effect of such isolationism is 
perhaps more muted than Bookman suggests. For example, U.S. courts seem 
far more willing to embrace public law cases with a transnational valence even 
as they eschew increasing numbers of purely private transnational disputes. 
Thus, the “foreignness” of the cases that Bookman discusses might—
counterintuitively—not be the driving force behind the isolationism.  
I. THE HAPPENSTANCE OF ISOLATIONISM 
The phenomenon that Bookman describes likely did not arise from an ex-
plicit or well-conceived normative commitment to keeping transnational cases 
out of U.S. courts. To be clear, Bookman presents isolationism as an effect ra-
ther than a coherent philosophy that any judge or group of judges has pursued.7 
But exploring the problem’s complicated roots can help reveal its true scope 
and how to mitigate its most deleterious consequences. 
I want to situate the doctrines that are at the heart of Bookman’s analysis 
within two broader jurisprudential developments. Doing so reveals that the for-
eignness of transnational cases probably has only slight explanatory power. In-
stead, the rejection of such cases arose as two different strands of judicial 
thought collided: a move to harmonize certain procedural doctrines and an ef-
fort to combat litigation excesses. 
One might describe the first strand, with perhaps only the slightest over-
statement, as Justice Ginsburg’s project to fashion doctrinal coherence across a 
wide swath of procedural law. She has authored opinions in most of the Court’s 
 
 6. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts: Be-
coming a Paper Tiger?, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 663 (2012); Donald Earl Childress III, Escap-
ing Federal Law in Transnational Cases: The Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 
93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015); David L. Noll, The New Conflicts Law, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX 
LITIG. 41 (2014). 
 7. See Bookman, supra note 2, at 1084-85, 1089. 
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recent cases grappling with personal jurisdiction,8 jurisdictional sequencing,9 
and the appropriate use of the term “jurisdictional” (and the consequences of 
truly jurisdictional rules).10 In most—but importantly, not all—of these cases 
and their progeny, Justice Ginsburg has been on the winning side. 
There are common themes running through Justice Ginsburg’s opinions, as 
I’ve explored at greater length in earlier work.11 To characterize these opinions 
at a high level of abstraction, she has focused on defining certain structural in-
terests, like jurisdictional doctrines, with specificity12 as well as fostering 
greater flexibility and efficiency among lower courts.13 Perhaps most critically 
for present purposes, she has sought to alleviate discord between the procedural 
regimes of the United States and those of other countries.14 In so doing, Justice 
Ginsburg has explicitly addressed one of the problems that Bookman explores: 
the concern that idiosyncratic U.S. doctrine could put U.S. litigants in a far 
worse position than their foreign counterparts.15 In other words, Justice Gins-
burg is the opposite of a litigation isolationist. 
How then did a Justice who is so attuned to transnational questions author 
three of the isolationist opinions that Bookman discusses?16 Although Justice 
 
 8. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Opera-
tions, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 
2780, 2794 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 9. Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010); Sinochem Int’l Co. v. 
Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 
U.S. 574 (1999).  
 10. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 
(2004). 
 11. See generally Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
501 (2015) [hereinafter Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions]; Alan M. Trammell, Juris-
dictional Sequencing, 47 GA. L. REV. 1099 (2013) [hereinafter Trammell, Jurisdictional Se-
quencing]. 
 12. See Trammell, Jurisdictional Sequencing, supra note 11, at 1141 & n.192.   
 13. Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
725, 742 (2009) (noting that efficiency justifications were “certainly foremost” in motivating 
Sinochem and Ruhrgas); see Trammell, Jurisdictional Sequencing, supra note 11, at 1101-10 
(describing the flexibility of a liberal jurisdictional-sequencing regime); see also, e.g., Kon-
trick, 540 U.S. at 454-56 (noting that mere “claim-processing rules,” in contrast to truly ju-
risdictional rules, are more flexible and subject to forfeiture). 
 14. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762-63 (2014); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2803-04 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 15. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2803-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that U.S. 
plaintiffs, unlike foreign plaintiffs, do not necessarily have the ability to sue where a harmful 
event occurred); Bookman, supra note 2, at 1107 & n.172 (same). 
 16. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753-58 (limiting the availability of general jurisdiction); 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854-57 (2011) (same); 
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429-35 (2007) (permitting 
forum non conveniens dismissals even before a federal court has verified its subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
36 STANFORD LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 68:33 
 
Ginsburg has developed a comprehensive and coherent theory of personal ju-
risdiction writ large, a majority of the Court has signed on to only part of that 
project. In broad strokes, she has embraced the functionalist jurisdictional re-
gime that several scholars in the mid-twentieth century envisioned17—one that 
cabins the traditional approach (general jurisdiction)18 and concomitantly en-
dorses the breadth and flexibility of the modern approach (specific jurisdic-
tion).19 But Justice Ginsburg’s expansive view of specific jurisdiction has con-
stituted a minority position within the Court.20 At the same time, her opinions 
constricting the scope of general jurisdiction have commanded nearly unani-
mous support.21 
If the Court had adopted a generous view of specific jurisdiction, one that 
would have allowed far more transnational cases into the United States, the nar-
rowing of general jurisdiction would have proved far less problematic (or iso-
lating). The same is true with respect to Sinochem, the forum non conveniens 
opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg. In context, dismissing the case was quite 
sensitive to transnational concerns because the United States had hardly any 
connection to, or interest in, the lawsuit.22 Put simply, although Justice Gins-
burg’s broader project is attuned to transnational problems, the rest of the Court 
has not wholly joined that project. 
The second strand, which at times has collided with the doctrinal-
coherence strand, concerns the development of a series of domestic litigation 
avoidance doctrines. Most conspicuous among these are the new plausibility 
pleading standard and the ever-stronger presumption in favor of arbitration. 
 
 17. The Supreme Court: 2013 Term—Leading Cases, 128 HARV. L. REV. 311, 311 
(2014). See generally Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudi-
cate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1144, 1164 (1966) (describing the envi-
sioned regime). 
 18. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753-58 (restricting general jurisdiction to the limited 
number of places where a corporation is “at home”). General jurisdiction is based on a tight 
connection between the forum and the defendant, such that the defendant is amenable to any 
suit in that location, even when the lawsuit has nothing to do with the forum. For decades 
though, lower courts had exercised such jurisdiction based on shockingly loose connections 
between the forum and the defendant. See Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions, supra note 
11, at 511-12. 
 19. See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2797-803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing for an ex-
pansive approach to specific jurisdiction that focuses primarily on fairness and reasonable-
ness). Specific jurisdiction is predicated on a relationship between the forum and the lawsuit 
itself. 
 20. See id. at 2794 (garnering only three total votes). 
 21. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (eight votes); Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (unanimous). 
 22. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 435 (2007) 
(calling it a “textbook case for immediate forum non conveniens dismissal” as the parties 
were Chinese or Malaysian companies and proceedings had already commenced in China). 
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One might justifiably include a number of other doctrines in the discussion,23 
but the pleading and arbitration cases are especially relevant because they take 
direct aim at the perceived inefficiencies of contemporary civil litigation. 
Whether the motivating problems are real or chimerical—and scholars have ar-
gued all sides of that debate—the doctrines explicitly seek to regulate litigation 
as a whole rather than domestic or transnational cases as such. 
Since 2007, the Court has required plaintiffs to plead “sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”24 Scholars overwhelmingly have recognized that the plausibility plead-
ing standard has raised the bar that plaintiffs must clear to survive a motion to 
dismiss.25 Despite the criticism that commentators have voiced, they largely 
agree that the Court was attempting to counter what the Court saw as the un-
wieldiness and rising costs of litigation. In particular, the Court was responding 
to fears about burgeoning discovery costs and the resulting pressure to settle 
even meritless cases.26 Myriad questions remain about the new pleading stand-
ard, but the Court’s agenda is clear: combating perceived inefficiency by mak-
ing it harder for litigants to get into court. 
A similar trend is apparent with respect to arbitration. Since the early 
1980s, the Supreme Court has embraced a sweeping vision of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act27 and “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”28 
To the extent that litigation has grown cumbersome, unwieldy, and expensive, 
arbitration—in the Court’s view—appears to offer an antidote. The Court has 
lauded arbitration’s informality as cost effective, streamlined, and expedi-
 
 23. See supra note 6. For example, some scholars also consider choice-of-law doc-
trines, forum selection clauses, and the Supreme Court’s recent class action jurisprudence. 
See Noll, supra note 6, at 58-62 (choice of law); id. at 66-70 (forum selection); Childress, 
supra note 6, at 1034-36 (class actions). 
 24. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 
 25. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing 
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 833 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to 
Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 19 (2010); 
A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009). 
 26. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 25, at 852; Miller, supra note 25, at 53-
71. 
 27. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 
(2013)); see Salvatore U. Bonaccorso, Note, State Court Resistance to Federal Arbitration 
Law, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (2015) (noting that the Court has construed the Federal 
Arbitration Act to “govern arbitration in nearly all circumstances”). 
 28. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
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tious,29 and since 2010, the trend toward favoring arbitration—and thereby 
keeping certain disputes outside the realm of litigation—has only accelerated.30  
These two strands—doctrinal coherence and domestic litigation avoid-
ance—interact to produce most of the isolationism that Bookman elucidates. To 
be clear, though, that phenomenon is not simply the international manifestation 
of the domestic litigation avoidance doctrines that I have briefly sketched. Ra-
ther, the two strands compound one another in the transnational context. The 
Nicastro case nicely illustrates how the doctrinal coherence cases—particularly 
the personal jurisdiction jurisprudence—create hurdles in transnational cases 
separate from those created by the domestic litigation avoidance cases. In 
Nicastro, a British manufacturer sold an industrial shearing machine that 
harmed a worker in New Jersey, but the manufacturer was not subject to specif-
ic jurisdiction there.31 The specific jurisdiction determination—that because the 
manufacturer had not expressly targeted the forum state, it was able to avoid 
jurisdiction there—would have been the same if the manufacturer had been a 
domestic corporation.  
But under the newly narrowed approach to general jurisdiction, foreign de-
fendants receive vastly different treatment. A domestic corporation is subject to 
general jurisdiction in at least one place in the United States,32 whereas a for-
eign corporation need not be. The upshot is that in a case like Nicastro, a for-
eign manufacturer whose product causes harm in the United States might not be 
suable in any U.S. court.33 In the transnational context, then, the personal juris-
 
 29. See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 
124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3074-83 (2015) (analyzing cases and describing the recent trend in fa-
vor of arbitration and its perceived advantages). 
 30. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308, 2312 (2013) 
(refusing to invalidate an arbitration agreement that prohibited class arbitration, even when 
proceeding as a class offered the only economically viable way to bring antitrust claims); 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750-51 (2011) (holding that the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act preempts a California court’s ruling that prohibited consumer contracts 
of adhesion from containing class-arbitration waivers); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act prohibits 
class arbitration unless the parties expressly agreed to such procedures).  
 31. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786, 2790-91 (2011) 
(plurality opinion) (basing its holding partly on the fact that the machine passed through an 
out-of-state distribution chain rather than arriving directly in New Jersey). 
 32. A domestic corporation will be subject to general jurisdiction at least in the state 
(or states, if they are different) where it is incorporated and where it maintains its principal 
place of business. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). 
 33. There is an argument that the defendant in Nicastro could have been subject to 
specific jurisdiction in Ohio, where its exclusive distributor was located. See generally 
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the distribution relationship). 
Even that is not certain. In any event, the plurality opinion essentially provides a roadmap 
for foreign corporations to avoid being amenable to personal jurisdiction anywhere in the 
United States. See id. at 2795 (noting that a corporation “need only Pilate-like wash its hands 
of a product by having independent distributors market it” to avoid being haled into court 
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diction jurisprudence keeps even more cases out of U.S. courts than would the 
domestic litigation avoidance doctrines alone. Thus, the acute inhospitality to 
certain transnational disputes seems to be the collateral consequence of two co-
herent, but orthogonal, agendas that are largely domestic in nature. 
II. ISOLATIONISM’S MUTED EFFECTS 
Regardless of its causes, the problem that Bookman elucidates is real. But 
it does not manifest itself with equal force across all transnational cases. Alt-
hough private transnational disputes are becoming more difficult to litigate in 
the United States, the Supreme Court has evinced much less reticence regarding 
public law disputes that have transnational and international consequences. 
This conclusion is more tentative, but figuring out what is not contributing to 
isolationism can be equally fruitful in discerning the phenomenon’s contours. 
Bookman brackets other doctrines—specifically the political question and 
act of state doctrines—that theoretically might seem to contribute to isolation-
ism but, in fact, do not.34 In the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement 
on the political question doctrine, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivo-
tofsky I),35 the parents of a U.S. child born in Jerusalem wanted the child’s U.S. 
passport to state that his place of birth was “Israel.” An act of Congress ex-
pressly allowed parents to make that choice, but State Department policy re-
quired that the passport record the birthplace simply as “Jerusalem” so as to 
avoid taking sides in the enduring debate about Jerusalem’s status.36 Few cases 
could have more profound consequences for foreign relations or domestic sepa-
ration of powers. Yet the Court found that the case did not present a nonjustici-
able political question.37 Instead, Zivotofsky I seemed to further narrow the po-
litical question doctrine to only its classical elements38 and, notwithstanding the 
case’s foreign-relations overtones, exuded an air of judicial confidence.39 
 
(quoting Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 531, 555 (1995))).  
 34. See Bookman, supra note 2, at 1089 n.34. A case presents a nonjusticiable political 
question when “there is ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to 
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stand-
ards for resolving it . . . .’” Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (omission in 
original) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). The act of state doctrine pre-
vents federal courts from sitting in judgment of certain acts of foreign states that have oc-
curred within the foreign sovereign’s territory. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tecton-
ics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990). 
 35. 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). 
 36. See id. at 1425-26. 
 37. See id. at 1430-31. 
 38. Compare Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (describing six factors that courts use in assessing 
whether a case presents a political question), with Zivotovsky I, 132 S. Ct. at 1427 (mention-
ing only the first two factors from Baker). See generally Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme 
than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 
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In a similar vein, the Supreme Court’s last significant word on the act of 
state doctrine came twenty-five years ago,40 when it arguably narrowed the 
doctrine’s scope.41 To be sure, lower courts sometimes use the act of state doc-
trine as a means of avoiding certain questions presented in transnational litiga-
tion.42 But in an era in which the Supreme Court has reinvigorated (and even 
invented) some domestic litigation avoidance doctrines, its reluctance to use 
other avoidance levers is telling. 
What distinguishes the doctrines that Bookman analyzes from the political 
question and act of state doctrines is largely the distinction between private and 
public law litigation. I concede that I am painting with a very broad brush and 
that one certainly can point to exceptions. But I am skeptical whether the for-
eignness of a dispute has driven the overarching phenomenon that Bookman 
describes.43 Indeed, the Supreme Court has embraced its role in deciding con-
troversial and salient international public law questions, including many con-
cerning the war on terror.44 And the Court just answered the underlying merits 
question from Zivotofsky I.45 
If I am right that a dichotomy has emerged between private and public liti-
gation, two questions immediately come to mind: What explains the dichoto-
my, and why does it matter? The first is difficult, if not impossible, to answer. 
Certainly those commentators who see the Roberts Court as overly solicitous of 
business interests might view the dichotomy as further evidence of their thesis. 
 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002) (describing the Court’s post-Baker return to the “classical” 
version of the doctrine). 
 39. See Zivotofsky I, 132 S. Ct. at 1428. 
 40. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990). 
 41. See Andrew D. Patterson, The Act of State Doctrine is Alive and Well, 15 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 111, 121-22 (2008); Steven R. Swanson, A Threshold Test for Validity: The 
Supreme Court Narrows the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 889, 918 
(1991).  
 42. See, e.g., Hourani v. Mirtchev, Nos. 13-7088, 13-7089, 2015 WL 4590324, at *7-9 
(D.C. Cir. July 31, 2015) (dismissing a defamation action predicated on statements published 
by a foreign embassy); Konowaloff v. Metro. Museum of Art, 702 F.3d 140, 147-48 (2d Cir. 
2012) (dismissing an action questioning the legality of the Soviet government’s appropria-
tion of property in 1918). 
 43. See Bookman, supra note 2, at 1089. Perhaps the one exception to this is the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality. As a canon of statutory interpretation, though, Congress 
can override it. Moreover, it is only one piece of the puzzle. 
 44. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567-68 (2006) (evaluating the legal-
ity of a military commission set up to try terrorists); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 
(2004) (considering enemy combatants’ due process rights); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 
483-85 (2004) (holding that U.S. courts had jurisdiction to hear challenges to foreign nation-
als’ detainment at Guantanamo Bay).  
 45. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II), 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094 
(2015) (holding that the President alone has the power to recognize foreign sovereigns and 
that Congress could not authorize passports that contain birthplace information contradicting 
the President’s determinations). 
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The second question, though, is far more interesting. It cuts to the ultimate 
problem that Bookman and others engage—how to mitigate the worst effects of 
isolationism, such as excluding cases that actually have strong ties to the Unit-
ed States. If my initial diagnosis is correct, scholars and litigants who are trying 
to reverse the trend should be less concerned about the foreignness of cases. In-
stead, they should focus on the more quotidian concerns that appear to impel 
the doctrines: concerns about litigation inefficiencies, discovery costs, and the 
like, which might ultimately be driving the phenomenon. 
CONCLUSION 
The landscape of U.S. procedure has changed dramatically in the last dec-
ade, and for all of the careful and insightful work that scholars like Bookman 
already have done, intriguing questions and puzzles remain. Although this de-
bate probably will not break the Internet the way “the dress” did, it is still a 
worthy enterprise. 
 
